fix(git)!: use internal proxy for all git operations (#39426)

Introduces gitproxy module which spawns a small forward proxy as scanner
for git calls
Replaces hostmatcher with matchlist which supports port rules
Deprecates ALLOWED_DOMAINS/BLOCKED_DOMAINS and ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS
settings in migration in favor of full names we have in security
configs.
Removes `external` preset in favor of lax/strict modes, strict mode
requiring explicit ports if they aren't standard http/s ones.

Breaking changes:
- `external` preset no longer works as deny rule. To enforce that, use
`strict` mode and allow ranges to connect to
- Wildcards are no longer accepted in IP addresses
- `*` is no longer allowed as entry in lists
- domain rules now use curl like syntax `*.example.com` matching
subdomains but not `example.com`, `example.com` matching itself and all
subdomains. `example.*` is not a valid rule
- In the default `lax` mode, `[security] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` no longer
restricts public hosts, set `EGRESS_MODE = strict` to keep an exclusive
list. A startup warning flags this
- Invalid list entries are logged at startup, invalid
`BLOCKED_HOST_LIST`/`BLOCKED_DOMAINS` entries stop it

Docs: https://gitea.com/gitea/docs/pulls/557
Signed-off-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
authored and GitHub committed 2026-09-29 14:43:36 +02:00
1 parent ebcb0150d1
commit 1b1274486c
57 files changed
+2356 -1106

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+2 -14
View File
@@ -19,11 +19,10 @@ import (
user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
auth_module "gitea.dev/modules/auth"
"gitea.dev/modules/container"
"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
"gitea.dev/modules/egress"
"gitea.dev/modules/httplib"
"gitea.dev/modules/log"
"gitea.dev/modules/optional"
"gitea.dev/modules/proxy"
"gitea.dev/modules/session"
"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
"gitea.dev/services/audit"
@@ -300,21 +299,10 @@ func showLinkingLogin(ctx *context.Context, authSourceID int64, gothUser goth.Us
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/link_account")
}
// oauth2AvatarAllowList parses the host allow-list applied to avatar fetches from the global
// [security] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST, defaulting an empty setting to the built-in "external" set. An empty
// host-match list would otherwise disable the allow-list check entirely and permit any host, including
// loopback/private addresses (SSRF).
func oauth2AvatarAllowList() *hostmatcher.HostMatchList {
return hostmatcher.ParseHostMatchList("security.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", setting.Security.AllowedHostList)
}
// oauth2AvatarHTTPClient builds the SSRF-protected client for avatar fetches. It is constructed per call
// so a changed allowlist takes effect (avatar fetches are infrequent, so this is not a hot path).
func oauth2AvatarHTTPClient() *http.Client {
allowList := oauth2AvatarAllowList()
return &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
Transport: hostmatcher.NewHTTPTransport("oauth2-avatar", allowList, nil, proxy.Proxy(), setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed, nil),
Transport: egress.NewSecurityPolicy("oauth2-avatar").NewHTTPTransport(),
}
}
+2 -16
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,7 @@ import (
"gitea.dev/models/auth"
"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
"gitea.dev/modules/test"
"gitea.dev/modules/egress/policy"
"gitea.dev/services/oauth2_provider"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
@@ -98,24 +96,12 @@ func TestOAuth2AvatarClientBlocksLoopback(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t, hit.Load(), "avatar client must refuse to dial a loopback address")
}
func TestOAuth2AvatarAllowListRestricts(t *testing.T) {
defer test.MockVariableValue(&setting.Security.AllowedHostList, "avatars.example.com")()
allowList := oauth2AvatarAllowList()
assert.True(t, allowList.MatchHostName("avatars.example.com"), "the configured host must be allowed")
assert.False(t, allowList.MatchHostName("8.8.8.8"), "an unrelated external host must be rejected")
// the default `external` allow-list still permits external hosts
setting.Security.AllowedHostList = hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinExternal
assert.True(t, oauth2AvatarAllowList().MatchHostName("8.8.8.8"), "default allow-list permits external hosts")
}
func TestOAuth2AvatarClientBlocksCloudMetadata(t *testing.T) {
// external-only allow-list must reject link-local cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) at dial time
resp, err := oauth2AvatarHTTPClient().Get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
require.Error(t, err)
assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "can only call allowed HTTP servers",
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, policy.ErrDenied,
"avatar client must refuse a link-local cloud-metadata address")
}