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fix(git)!: use internal proxy for all git operations (#39426)
Introduces gitproxy module which spawns a small forward proxy as scanner for git calls Replaces hostmatcher with matchlist which supports port rules Deprecates ALLOWED_DOMAINS/BLOCKED_DOMAINS and ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS settings in migration in favor of full names we have in security configs. Removes `external` preset in favor of lax/strict modes, strict mode requiring explicit ports if they aren't standard http/s ones. Breaking changes: - `external` preset no longer works as deny rule. To enforce that, use `strict` mode and allow ranges to connect to - Wildcards are no longer accepted in IP addresses - `*` is no longer allowed as entry in lists - domain rules now use curl like syntax `*.example.com` matching subdomains but not `example.com`, `example.com` matching itself and all subdomains. `example.*` is not a valid rule - In the default `lax` mode, `[security] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` no longer restricts public hosts, set `EGRESS_MODE = strict` to keep an exclusive list. A startup warning flags this - Invalid list entries are logged at startup, invalid `BLOCKED_HOST_LIST`/`BLOCKED_DOMAINS` entries stop it Docs: https://gitea.com/gitea/docs/pulls/557 Signed-off-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io> Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
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57 files changed
+2356
-1106
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@@ -19,11 +19,10 @@ import (
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user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
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auth_module "gitea.dev/modules/auth"
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"gitea.dev/modules/container"
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"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
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"gitea.dev/modules/egress"
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"gitea.dev/modules/httplib"
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"gitea.dev/modules/log"
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"gitea.dev/modules/optional"
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"gitea.dev/modules/proxy"
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"gitea.dev/modules/session"
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"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
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"gitea.dev/services/audit"
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@@ -300,21 +299,10 @@ func showLinkingLogin(ctx *context.Context, authSourceID int64, gothUser goth.Us
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ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/link_account")
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}
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// oauth2AvatarAllowList parses the host allow-list applied to avatar fetches from the global
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// [security] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST, defaulting an empty setting to the built-in "external" set. An empty
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// host-match list would otherwise disable the allow-list check entirely and permit any host, including
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// loopback/private addresses (SSRF).
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func oauth2AvatarAllowList() *hostmatcher.HostMatchList {
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return hostmatcher.ParseHostMatchList("security.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", setting.Security.AllowedHostList)
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}
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// oauth2AvatarHTTPClient builds the SSRF-protected client for avatar fetches. It is constructed per call
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// so a changed allowlist takes effect (avatar fetches are infrequent, so this is not a hot path).
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func oauth2AvatarHTTPClient() *http.Client {
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allowList := oauth2AvatarAllowList()
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return &http.Client{
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Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
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Transport: hostmatcher.NewHTTPTransport("oauth2-avatar", allowList, nil, proxy.Proxy(), setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed, nil),
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Transport: egress.NewSecurityPolicy("oauth2-avatar").NewHTTPTransport(),
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}
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}
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@@ -12,9 +12,7 @@ import (
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"gitea.dev/models/auth"
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"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
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user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
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"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
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"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
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"gitea.dev/modules/test"
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"gitea.dev/modules/egress/policy"
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"gitea.dev/services/oauth2_provider"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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@@ -98,24 +96,12 @@ func TestOAuth2AvatarClientBlocksLoopback(t *testing.T) {
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assert.False(t, hit.Load(), "avatar client must refuse to dial a loopback address")
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}
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func TestOAuth2AvatarAllowListRestricts(t *testing.T) {
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defer test.MockVariableValue(&setting.Security.AllowedHostList, "avatars.example.com")()
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allowList := oauth2AvatarAllowList()
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assert.True(t, allowList.MatchHostName("avatars.example.com"), "the configured host must be allowed")
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assert.False(t, allowList.MatchHostName("8.8.8.8"), "an unrelated external host must be rejected")
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// the default `external` allow-list still permits external hosts
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setting.Security.AllowedHostList = hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinExternal
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assert.True(t, oauth2AvatarAllowList().MatchHostName("8.8.8.8"), "default allow-list permits external hosts")
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}
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func TestOAuth2AvatarClientBlocksCloudMetadata(t *testing.T) {
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// external-only allow-list must reject link-local cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) at dial time
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resp, err := oauth2AvatarHTTPClient().Get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
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if resp != nil {
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_ = resp.Body.Close()
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}
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "can only call allowed HTTP servers",
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assert.ErrorIs(t, err, policy.ErrDenied,
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"avatar client must refuse a link-local cloud-metadata address")
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}
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