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refactor: carry the API token on the doer (#39690)
The token a request authenticated with now lives on the doer, so permission and visibility checks apply its scope from the doer alone. Replaces https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39167, following https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39167#issuecomment-6063839619. 1. Public-only tokens get 404 instead of 403 for hidden users, orgs and repos, like GitHub. 2. Org ownership, site admin, repo and org creation, generation and transfer endpoints reject public-only tokens. 3. API pull request responses set `head.repo` to `null` and `head.repo_id` to `-1` when the caller cannot see the head repository. 4. Public-only tokens see org memberships like anonymous callers, so concealed members stay hidden. 5. Site admin access in activity feeds, follower lists, org members, Actions run lists and packages needs a session or an `all`-scoped token. Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
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@@ -21,21 +21,8 @@ import (
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"gitea.dev/routers/api/v1/utils"
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"gitea.dev/services/context"
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"gitea.dev/services/convert"
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"xorm.io/builder"
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)
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// actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery returns the sub-query restricting an owner-scoped actions
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// listing to the repos whose actions the caller can read, or nil when no restriction applies. A bare
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// org member must not be able to enumerate runs/jobs of repos they have no access to. A site admin may
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// skip the access filter, but a public-only token must stay confined to public repos even for an admin.
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func actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery(ctx *context.APIContext, ownerID int64) *builder.Builder {
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if ownerID > 0 && (ctx.Doer == nil || !ctx.Doer.IsAdmin || ctx.PublicOnly) {
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return repo_model.FindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDsSubQuery(ownerID, ctx.Doer, ctx.PublicOnly)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ListJobs lists jobs for api route validated ownerID and repoID
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// ownerID == 0 and repoID == 0 means all jobs
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// ownerID == 0 and repoID != 0 means all jobs for the given repo
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@@ -73,7 +60,7 @@ func ListJobs(ctx *context.APIContext, ownerID, repoID, runID int64, runAttemptI
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opts.Statuses = append(opts.Statuses, values...)
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}
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opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery = actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery(ctx, opts.OwnerID)
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opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery = repo_model.FindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDsSubQuery(opts.OwnerID, ctx.Doer)
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jobs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRunJob](ctx, opts)
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if err != nil {
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@@ -185,7 +172,7 @@ func ListRuns(ctx *context.APIContext, ownerID, repoID int64, workflowID string)
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}
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excludePullRequests := ctx.FormBool("exclude_pull_requests")
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opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery = actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery(ctx, opts.OwnerID)
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opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery = repo_model.FindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDsSubQuery(opts.OwnerID, ctx.Doer)
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runs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRun](ctx, opts)
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if err != nil {
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@@ -1686,11 +1686,10 @@ func ListProjectColumnIssues(ctx *context.APIContext) {
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} else {
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// an owner-level board spans repositories, so filter to what this doer may see
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issuesOpts.Owner = scope.Owner
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issuesOpts.Doer = ctx.Doer
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issuesOpts.AllPublic = ctx.Doer == nil
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if ctx.PublicOnly {
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if user_model.DoerCanViewPrivate(ctx.Doer) {
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issuesOpts.Doer = ctx.Doer
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} else {
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issuesOpts.AllPublic = true
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issuesOpts.Doer = nil // a public-only token must not reach the doer's private repos
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}
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}
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