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mirror of https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git synced 2026-05-16 23:27:40 +02:00

fix(oauth): strengthen PKCE validation and refresh token replay protection (#37706)

This PR tightens several OAuth validation paths related to PKCE
handling, redirect URI normalization, and refresh-token replay safety.

What it changes:

- switch redirect URI comparison to ASCII-only normalization for
exact-match checks, avoiding Unicode case-folding surprises
- harden PKCE verification by:
  - allowing PKCE omission only when no challenge data was stored
  - rejecting exchanges with a missing verifier when PKCE was used
- rejecting malformed challenge state where a challenge exists without a
valid method
  - comparing derived challenges with constant-time string matching
- make refresh-token invalidation counter updates conditional on the
previously observed counter value, so stale refresh state cannot be
accepted after the grant changes

Why:

These checks close gaps where:
- redirect URI comparisons could rely on broader Unicode normalization
than intended
- malformed or incomplete PKCE state could be treated too permissively
- concurrent or stale refresh-token use could advance the same grant
more than once

---------

Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude (Opus 4.7) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com>
This commit is contained in:
Lunny Xiao 2026-05-16 08:17:00 -07:00 committed by GitHub
parent 33923a4d7c
commit ae69aec295
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2 changed files with 146 additions and 63 deletions

View File

@ -5,9 +5,8 @@ package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base32"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
@ -24,6 +23,7 @@ import (
uuid "github.com/google/uuid"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
"golang.org/x/oauth2"
"xorm.io/builder"
"xorm.io/xorm"
)
@ -31,7 +31,10 @@ import (
// Authorization codes should expire within 10 minutes per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.2
const oauth2AuthorizationCodeValidity = 10 * time.Minute
var ErrOAuth2AuthorizationCodeInvalidated = errors.New("oauth2 authorization code already invalidated")
var (
ErrOAuth2AuthorizationCodeInvalidated = errors.New("oauth2 authorization code already invalidated")
ErrOAuth2GrantStaleCounter = errors.New("oauth2 grant state changed during token refresh")
)
// OAuth2Application represents an OAuth2 client (RFC 6749)
type OAuth2Application struct {
@ -151,30 +154,40 @@ func (app *OAuth2Application) ContainsRedirectURI(redirectURI string) bool {
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6819#section-5.2.3.3
// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#AuthRequest
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-12#section-3.1
contains := func(s string) bool {
s = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(s), "/")
for _, u := range app.RedirectURIs {
if strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(u), "/") == s {
redirectCandidates := []string{redirectURI}
if !app.ConfidentialClient {
loopbackRedirect, ok := normalizePublicClientRedirectURI(redirectURI)
if ok {
redirectCandidates = append(redirectCandidates, loopbackRedirect)
}
}
for _, candidate := range redirectCandidates {
normalizedCandidate := normalizeRedirectURIForComparison(candidate)
for _, registeredURI := range app.RedirectURIs {
if normalizeRedirectURIForComparison(registeredURI) == normalizedCandidate {
return true
}
}
return false
}
if !app.ConfidentialClient {
uri, err := url.Parse(redirectURI)
// ignore port for http loopback uris following https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8252#section-7.3
if err == nil && uri.Scheme == "http" && uri.Port() != "" {
ip := net.ParseIP(uri.Hostname())
if ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback() {
// strip port
uri.Host = uri.Hostname()
if contains(uri.String()) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
func normalizeRedirectURIForComparison(redirectURI string) string {
return strings.TrimSuffix(util.ToLowerASCII(redirectURI), "/")
}
func normalizePublicClientRedirectURI(redirectURI string) (string, bool) {
parsedURI, err := url.Parse(redirectURI)
if err != nil || parsedURI.Scheme != "http" || parsedURI.Port() == "" {
return "", false
}
return contains(redirectURI)
if ip := net.ParseIP(parsedURI.Hostname()); ip == nil || !ip.IsLoopback() {
return "", false
}
parsedURI.Host = parsedURI.Hostname()
return parsedURI.String(), true
}
// Base32 characters, but lowercased.
@ -424,22 +437,34 @@ func (code *OAuth2AuthorizationCode) Invalidate(ctx context.Context) error {
return nil
}
func (code *OAuth2AuthorizationCode) requiresCodeVerifier() bool {
return code.CodeChallengeMethod != "" || code.CodeChallenge != ""
}
func deriveCodeChallenge(method, verifier string) (string, bool) {
switch method {
case "S256":
return oauth2.S256ChallengeFromVerifier(verifier), true
case "plain":
return verifier, true
default:
return "", false
}
}
// ValidateCodeChallenge validates the given verifier against the saved code challenge. This is part of the PKCE implementation.
func (code *OAuth2AuthorizationCode) ValidateCodeChallenge(verifier string) bool {
switch code.CodeChallengeMethod {
case "S256":
// base64url(SHA256(verifier)) see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636#section-4.6
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier))
hashedVerifier := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
return hashedVerifier == code.CodeChallenge
case "plain":
return verifier == code.CodeChallenge
case "":
if !code.requiresCodeVerifier() {
return true
default:
// unsupported method -> return false
}
if verifier == "" || code.CodeChallengeMethod == "" {
return false
}
expectedChallenge, ok := deriveCodeChallenge(code.CodeChallengeMethod, verifier)
if !ok {
return false
}
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(expectedChallenge), []byte(code.CodeChallenge)) == 1
}
// GetOAuth2AuthorizationByCode returns an authorization by its code
@ -504,15 +529,18 @@ func (grant *OAuth2Grant) GenerateNewAuthorizationCode(ctx context.Context, redi
// IncreaseCounter increases the counter and updates the grant
func (grant *OAuth2Grant) IncreaseCounter(ctx context.Context) error {
_, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(grant.ID).Incr("counter").Update(new(OAuth2Grant))
affected, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).
Where("id = ?", grant.ID).
And("counter = ?", grant.Counter).
Incr("counter").
Update(new(OAuth2Grant))
if err != nil {
return err
}
updatedGrant, err := GetOAuth2GrantByID(ctx, grant.ID)
if err != nil {
return err
if affected == 0 {
return ErrOAuth2GrantStaleCounter
}
grant.Counter = updatedGrant.Counter
grant.Counter++
return nil
}

View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/oauth2"
)
func TestOAuth2AuthorizationCode(t *testing.T) {
@ -116,6 +117,47 @@ func TestOAuth2Application_ContainsRedirect_Slash(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t, app.ContainsRedirectURI("http://127.0.0.1/other"))
}
func TestOAuth2Application_ContainsRedirectURI_ASCIIOnlyNormalization(t *testing.T) {
testCases := []struct {
name string
registered []string
redirectURI string
allowed bool
}{
{
name: "exact-match",
registered: []string{"https://signin.example.test/callback"},
redirectURI: "https://signin.example.test/callback",
allowed: true,
},
{
name: "ascii-case-insensitive",
registered: []string{"https://signin.example.test/callback"},
redirectURI: "https://signIN.example.test/callback",
allowed: true,
},
{
name: "non-ascii-not-folded",
registered: []string{"https://signin.example.test/callback"},
redirectURI: "https://signİn.example.test/callback",
allowed: false,
},
{
name: "loopback-strips-port",
registered: []string{"http://127.0.0.1/callback"},
redirectURI: "http://127.0.0.1:12345/callback",
allowed: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
app := &auth_model.OAuth2Application{RedirectURIs: tc.registered}
assert.Equal(t, tc.allowed, app.ContainsRedirectURI(tc.redirectURI))
})
}
}
func TestOAuth2Application_ValidateClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
app := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &auth_model.OAuth2Application{ID: 1})
@ -193,6 +235,16 @@ func TestOAuth2Grant_IncreaseCounter(t *testing.T) {
unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &auth_model.OAuth2Grant{ID: 1, Counter: 2})
}
func TestOAuth2Grant_IncreaseCounterRejectsStaleCounter(t *testing.T) {
assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
grant := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &auth_model.OAuth2Grant{ID: 1, Counter: 1})
stale := *grant
assert.NoError(t, grant.IncreaseCounter(t.Context()))
err := stale.IncreaseCounter(t.Context())
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, auth_model.ErrOAuth2GrantStaleCounter)
}
func TestOAuth2Grant_ScopeContains(t *testing.T) {
assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
grant := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &auth_model.OAuth2Grant{ID: 1, Scope: "openid profile"})
@ -237,35 +289,38 @@ func TestRevokeOAuth2Grant(t *testing.T) {
//////////////////// Authorization Code
func TestOAuth2AuthorizationCode_ValidateCodeChallenge(t *testing.T) {
// test plain
code := &auth_model.OAuth2AuthorizationCode{
CodeChallengeMethod: "plain",
CodeChallenge: "test123",
}
assert.True(t, code.ValidateCodeChallenge("test123"))
assert.False(t, code.ValidateCodeChallenge("ierwgjoergjio"))
s256Verifier := "s256-verifier"
s256Challenge := oauth2.S256ChallengeFromVerifier(s256Verifier)
missingVerifierChallenge := oauth2.S256ChallengeFromVerifier("verifier-not-supplied")
// test S256
code = &auth_model.OAuth2AuthorizationCode{
CodeChallengeMethod: "S256",
CodeChallenge: "CjvyTLSdR47G5zYenDA-eDWW4lRrO8yvjcWwbD_deOg",
testCases := []struct {
name string
method string
challenge string
verifier string
valid bool
}{
{"plain-success", "plain", "plain-secret", "plain-secret", true},
{"plain-failure", "plain", "plain-secret", "ierwgjoergjio", false},
{"s256-success", "S256", s256Challenge, s256Verifier, true},
{"s256-failure", "S256", s256Challenge, "wiogjerogorewngoenrgoiuenorg", false},
{"unsupported-method", "monkey", "foiwgjioriogeiogjerger", "foiwgjioriogeiogjerger", false},
{"no-pkce-configured", "", "", "", true},
{"s256-missing-verifier", "S256", missingVerifierChallenge, "", false},
{"plain-missing-verifier", "plain", "plain-secret", "", false},
{"missing-method-with-challenge", "", "foierjiogerogerg", "", false},
{"missing-method-rejects-even-matching-verifier", "", "foierjiogerogerg", "foierjiogerogerg", false},
}
assert.True(t, code.ValidateCodeChallenge("N1Zo9-8Rfwhkt68r1r29ty8YwIraXR8eh_1Qwxg7yQXsonBt"))
assert.False(t, code.ValidateCodeChallenge("wiogjerogorewngoenrgoiuenorg"))
// test unknown
code = &auth_model.OAuth2AuthorizationCode{
CodeChallengeMethod: "monkey",
CodeChallenge: "foiwgjioriogeiogjerger",
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
code := &auth_model.OAuth2AuthorizationCode{
CodeChallengeMethod: tc.method,
CodeChallenge: tc.challenge,
}
assert.Equal(t, tc.valid, code.ValidateCodeChallenge(tc.verifier))
})
}
assert.False(t, code.ValidateCodeChallenge("foiwgjioriogeiogjerger"))
// test no code challenge
code = &auth_model.OAuth2AuthorizationCode{
CodeChallengeMethod: "",
CodeChallenge: "foierjiogerogerg",
}
assert.True(t, code.ValidateCodeChallenge(""))
}
func TestOAuth2AuthorizationCode_GenerateRedirectURI(t *testing.T) {