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mirror of https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git synced 2026-07-14 05:31:45 +02:00
gitea/modules/auth/openid/openid_test.go
bircni f69e15afe7
fix: various security fixes (#38406)
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
2026-07-12 17:14:09 +00:00

30 lines
872 B
Go

// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package openid
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestOpenIDDiscoveryBlocksInternalHost(t *testing.T) {
var reached atomic.Bool
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
reached.Store(true)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer srv.Close()
// RedirectURL performs server-side discovery of the identifier URL; a loopback URL
// must be refused at dial time instead of reaching the internal server
_, err := RedirectURL(srv.URL, "http://example.com/callback", "http://example.com/")
require.Error(t, err)
assert.False(t, reached.Load(), "OpenID discovery must not reach an internal/loopback host")
}