mirror of
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git
synced 2026-07-13 16:35:32 +02:00
f69e15afe7
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:
- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.
### 📌 Attention for site admins
Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:
- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.
---------
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
38 lines
1.2 KiB
Go
38 lines
1.2 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package private
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import (
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"testing"
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"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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)
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func TestInternalAPIConnectionIsLocal(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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protocol setting.Scheme
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localURL string
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want bool
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}{
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// HTTPUnix always dials the unix socket (a local target), whatever LOCAL_ROOT_URL says
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{"unix socket", setting.HTTPUnix, "https://gitea.example.com/", true},
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{"localhost", setting.HTTP, "http://localhost:3000/", true},
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{"loopback ipv4", setting.HTTPS, "https://127.0.0.1:3000/", true},
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{"loopback ipv6", setting.HTTPS, "https://[::1]:3000/", true},
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// a non-loopback LOCAL_ROOT_URL is a real network hop and must be verified
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{"remote host", setting.HTTPS, "https://gitea.internal:443/", false},
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{"remote ip", setting.HTTPS, "https://10.0.0.5:3000/", false},
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// an unparseable LOCAL_ROOT_URL is a hard misconfiguration; fail closed to verification
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{"invalid url", setting.HTTPS, "://bad", false},
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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assert.Equal(t, c.want, internalAPIConnectionIsLocal(c.protocol, c.localURL))
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})
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}
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}
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