mirror of
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git
synced 2026-07-17 02:23:53 +02:00
f69e15afe7
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by area: - **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path. - **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation; keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings, star/watch lists, limited/private owners). - **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions, label/attachment scoping. - **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys. ### 📌 Attention for site admins Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth a look: - **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars, OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches internal hosts, you may need to add them to `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` settings). - **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` instead; the old key still works for now. --------- Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io> Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
56 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
56 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2017 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
|
|
|
|
package openid
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"sync"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
|
|
"gitea.dev/modules/proxy"
|
|
"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/yohcop/openid-go"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// For the demo, we use in-memory infinite storage nonce and discovery
|
|
// cache. In your app, do not use this as it will eat up memory and
|
|
// never
|
|
// free it. Use your own implementation, on a better database system.
|
|
// If you have multiple servers for example, you may need to share at
|
|
// least
|
|
// the nonceStore between them.
|
|
var (
|
|
nonceStore = openid.NewSimpleNonceStore()
|
|
discoveryCache = newTimedDiscoveryCache(24 * time.Hour)
|
|
|
|
// openIDInstance does discovery/verification via an SSRF-protected client, so a user-supplied
|
|
// OpenID identifier can't reach internal/loopback/reserved addresses. It honors the operator's
|
|
// [security] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST (empty defaults to "external"), matching the avatar/webhook/migration
|
|
// clients, and validates the proxy path too. Lazy: reads proxy/settings once.
|
|
openIDInstance = sync.OnceValue(func() *openid.OpenID {
|
|
allowList := hostmatcher.ParseHostMatchList("security.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", setting.Security.AllowedHostList)
|
|
return openid.NewOpenID(&http.Client{
|
|
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
Transport: hostmatcher.NewHTTPTransport("openid", allowList, nil, proxy.Proxy(), setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed, nil),
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Verify handles response from OpenID provider
|
|
func Verify(fullURL string) (id string, err error) {
|
|
return openIDInstance().Verify(fullURL, discoveryCache, nonceStore)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Normalize normalizes an OpenID URI
|
|
func Normalize(url string) (id string, err error) {
|
|
return openid.Normalize(url)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RedirectURL redirects browser
|
|
func RedirectURL(id, callbackURL, realm string) (string, error) {
|
|
return openIDInstance().RedirectURL(id, callbackURL, realm)
|
|
}
|