mirror of
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git
synced 2026-07-17 19:09:10 +02:00
f69e15afe7
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by area: - **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path. - **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation; keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings, star/watch lists, limited/private owners). - **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions, label/attachment scoping. - **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys. ### 📌 Attention for site admins Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth a look: - **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars, OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches internal hosts, you may need to add them to `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` settings). - **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` instead; the old key still works for now. --------- Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io> Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
38 lines
1.2 KiB
Go
38 lines
1.2 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
|
|
|
|
package packages
|
|
|
|
import "gitea.dev/modules/util"
|
|
|
|
// BoundedFileList accumulates file names from a package archive while enforcing caps on the number of
|
|
// entries and their total name length, returning an error once either cap would be exceeded.
|
|
type BoundedFileList struct {
|
|
files []string
|
|
nameBytes int
|
|
maxFiles int
|
|
maxBytes int
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewBoundedFileList creates a BoundedFileList with the given caps; a non-positive cap falls back to the
|
|
// corresponding default.
|
|
func NewBoundedFileList(maxFiles, maxNameBytes int) *BoundedFileList {
|
|
return &BoundedFileList{maxFiles: maxFiles, maxBytes: maxNameBytes}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add appends name, returning util.ErrInvalidArgument once the entry count or accumulated byte length
|
|
// would exceed the configured cap.
|
|
func (b *BoundedFileList) Add(name string) error {
|
|
if len(b.files) >= b.maxFiles || b.nameBytes+len(name) > b.maxBytes {
|
|
return util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("package contains too many file entries")
|
|
}
|
|
b.nameBytes += len(name)
|
|
b.files = append(b.files, name)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Files returns the accumulated file names.
|
|
func (b *BoundedFileList) Files() []string {
|
|
return b.files
|
|
}
|