Files
gitea/modules/uri/uri_test.go
T
f69e15afe7 fix: various security fixes (#38406)
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
2026-07-12 17:14:09 +00:00

70 lines
2.1 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2020 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package uri
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestReadURI(t *testing.T) {
p, err := filepath.Abs("./uri.go")
assert.NoError(t, err)
f, err := Open("file://" + p)
assert.NoError(t, err)
defer f.Close()
}
// TestOpenWithClientValidatesRedirectTarget verifies OpenWithClient routes the
// whole request chain (including redirects) through the provided client, so a
// client whose transport refuses to dial an internal target blocks a redirect to
// it — whereas the default client (old Open behavior) follows it.
func TestOpenWithClientValidatesRedirectTarget(t *testing.T) {
var internalHit atomic.Bool
internal := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
internalHit.Store(true)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("secret"))
}))
defer internal.Close()
front := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, internal.URL, http.StatusFound)
}))
defer front.Close()
internalAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(internal.URL, "http://")
// a client that refuses to dial the internal target, mimicking the migration
// hostmatcher dialer that re-validates every hop
blockingClient := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
if addr == internalAddr {
return nil, errors.New("blocked internal address")
}
return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
},
}}
_, err := OpenWithClient(front.URL, blockingClient)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.False(t, internalHit.Load(), "the redirect target must not be reached through the validating client")
// the default client (the previous behavior) follows the redirect to the internal target
internalHit.Store(false)
rc, err := Open(front.URL)
require.NoError(t, err)
_ = rc.Close()
assert.True(t, internalHit.Load(), "sanity check: the default client follows the redirect")
}