fix(auth): avoid "compromised account" false-alarm when login with remember-me token (#39686)

1. Remember the last token that has been rotated and skip its validation
2. Don't alarm when the token mismatch occurs in a short window
This commit is contained in:
wxiaoguang authored and GitHub committed 2026-10-12 08:44:52 +00:00
1 parent 8c7b8d085c
commit 2f1761e3fe
7 files changed
+118 -36

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+1
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@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ func prepareMigrationTasks() []*migration {
newMigration(356, "Add index on action_run commit_sha", v29.AddActionRunCommitSHAIndex),
newMigration(357, "Normalize legacy team authorize values", v29.NormalizeLegacyTeamAuthorize),
newMigration(358, "Track previous remember-me token hashes", v29.AddPreviousAuthTokenHash),
}
return preparedMigrations
}
+25
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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package v29
import (
"context"
"gitea.dev/modelmigration/base"
"gitea.dev/modules/timeutil"
"xorm.io/xorm"
)
func AddPreviousAuthTokenHash(_ context.Context, x base.EngineMigration) error {
type AuthToken struct {
PreviousTokenHash string
RotatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp
}
_, err := x.SyncWithOptions(xorm.SyncOptions{
IgnoreDropIndices: true,
IgnoreConstrains: true,
}, new(AuthToken))
return err
}
+7 -3
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@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ type AuthToken struct { //nolint:revive // export stutter
TokenHash string
UserID int64 `xorm:"INDEX"`
ExpiresUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"INDEX"`
PreviousTokenHash string // Identifies stale cookies without authenticating them.
RotatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp // Bounds the grace window for stale cookies.
}
func init() {
@@ -44,9 +47,10 @@ func GetAuthTokenByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*AuthToken, error) {
return at, nil
}
func UpdateAuthTokenByID(ctx context.Context, t *AuthToken) error {
_, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(t.ID).Cols("token_hash", "expires_unix").Update(t)
return err
func UpdateAuthTokenByID(ctx context.Context, t *AuthToken, oldHash string) (bool, error) {
affected, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(t.ID).Where("token_hash = ?", oldHash).
Cols("token_hash", "expires_unix", "previous_token_hash", "rotated_unix").Update(t)
return affected == 1, err
}
func DeleteAuthTokenByID(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
+30 -22
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@@ -78,49 +78,54 @@ func prepareCommonAuthPageData(ctx *context.Context, opt CommonAuthOptions) {
// autoSignIn reads cookie and try to auto-login.
func autoSignIn(ctx *context.Context) (bool, error) {
isSucceed := false
defer func() {
if !isSucceed {
ctx.DeleteSiteCookie(setting.CookieRememberName)
}
}()
cookieTokenValue := ctx.GetSiteCookie(setting.CookieRememberName)
if cookieTokenValue == "" {
return false, nil
}
if err := auth.DeleteExpiredAuthTokens(ctx); err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to delete expired auth tokens: %v", err)
}
t, err := auth_service.CheckAuthToken(ctx, ctx.GetSiteCookie(setting.CookieRememberName))
if err != nil {
switch err {
case auth_service.ErrAuthTokenInvalidFormat, auth_service.ErrAuthTokenExpired:
return false, nil
deleteCookie := true
defer func() {
if deleteCookie {
ctx.DeleteSiteCookie(setting.CookieRememberName)
}
return false, err
}
if t == nil {
}()
t, err := auth_service.CheckAuthToken(ctx, cookieTokenValue)
if errors.Is(err, auth_service.ErrAuthTokenStale) {
deleteCookie = false
return false, nil
} else if errors.Is(err, auth_service.ErrAuthTokenInvalidFormat) || errors.Is(err, auth_service.ErrAuthTokenExpired) {
return false, nil
} else if err != nil {
return false, err
}
u, err := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, t.UserID)
if err != nil {
if !user_model.IsErrUserNotExist(err) {
return false, fmt.Errorf("GetUserByID: %w", err)
}
if user_model.IsErrUserNotExist(err) {
return false, nil
} else if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("GetUserByID: %w", err)
}
userHasTwoFactorAuth, err := auth.HasTwoFactorOrWebAuthn(ctx, u.ID)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("HasTwoFactorOrWebAuthn: %w", err)
}
isSucceed = true
nt, token, err := auth_service.RegenerateAuthToken(ctx, t)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, auth_service.ErrAuthTokenStale) {
deleteCookie = false
return false, nil
} else if err != nil {
return false, err
}
ctx.SetSiteCookie(setting.CookieRememberName, nt.ID+":"+token, setting.LogInRememberDays*timeutil.Day)
deleteCookie = false
if err := regenerateSession(ctx, map[string]any{
session.KeyUID: u.ID,
@@ -130,7 +135,7 @@ func autoSignIn(ctx *context.Context) (bool, error) {
}
if err := resetLocale(ctx, u); err != nil {
return false, err
log.Error("Failed to reset locale for user %d: %v", u.ID, err)
}
return true, nil
@@ -374,6 +379,9 @@ func handleSignIn(ctx *context.Context, u *user_model.User, remember bool) {
func handleSignInFull(ctx *context.Context, u *user_model.User, remember bool) {
if remember {
if err := auth.DeleteExpiredAuthTokens(ctx); err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to delete expired auth tokens: %v", err)
}
nt, token, err := auth_service.CreateAuthTokenForUserID(ctx, u.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("CreateAuthTokenForUserID", err)
+20
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@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import (
"gitea.dev/modules/test"
"gitea.dev/modules/util"
"gitea.dev/modules/web"
auth_service "gitea.dev/services/auth"
"gitea.dev/services/auth/source/oauth2"
"gitea.dev/services/contexttest"
"gitea.dev/services/forms"
@@ -216,3 +217,22 @@ func TestRegisterOpenIDPostRejectsWrongCaptcha(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, true, ctx.Data["Err_Captcha"])
unittest.AssertNotExistsBean(t, &user_model.User{LowerName: "openid-captcha-user"})
}
func TestAutoSignInStaleCookie(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
at, token, err := auth_service.CreateAuthTokenForUserID(t.Context(), 2)
require.NoError(t, err)
current, currentToken, err := auth_service.RegenerateAuthToken(t.Context(), at)
require.NoError(t, err)
ctx, resp := contexttest.MockContext(t, "/user/login")
ctx.Req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: setting.CookieRememberName, Value: at.ID + ":" + token})
succeeded, err := autoSignIn(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.False(t, succeeded)
for _, cookie := range resp.Result().Cookies() {
assert.NotEqual(t, setting.CookieRememberName, cookie.Name)
}
_, err = auth_service.CheckAuthToken(t.Context(), current.ID+":"+currentToken)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
+18 -10
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@@ -25,15 +25,12 @@ import (
var (
ErrAuthTokenInvalidFormat = util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("auth token has an invalid format")
ErrAuthTokenStale = util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("auth token has been rotated")
ErrAuthTokenExpired = util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("auth token has expired")
ErrAuthTokenInvalidHash = util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("auth token is invalid")
)
func CheckAuthToken(ctx context.Context, value string) (*auth_model.AuthToken, error) {
if len(value) == 0 {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // the auth method is not applicable
}
parts := strings.SplitN(value, ":", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
return nil, ErrAuthTokenInvalidFormat
@@ -53,7 +50,12 @@ func CheckAuthToken(ctx context.Context, value string) (*auth_model.AuthToken, e
hashedToken := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[1]))
if !util.CryptoConstTimeEqual(t.TokenHash, hex.EncodeToString(hashedToken[:])) {
hash := hex.EncodeToString(hashedToken[:])
if !util.CryptoConstTimeEqual(t.TokenHash, hash) {
// Recently rotated cookies can still be in flight, but must not authenticate.
if t.RotatedUnix.AddDuration(time.Minute) >= timeutil.TimeStampNow() && util.CryptoConstTimeEqual(t.PreviousTokenHash, hash) {
return nil, ErrAuthTokenStale
}
// If an attacker steals a token and uses the token to create a new session the hash gets updated.
// When the victim uses the old token the hashes don't match anymore and the victim should be notified about the compromised token.
// Revoke the token so the attacker's rotated token (which shares this ID) can no longer be used.
@@ -70,15 +72,21 @@ func RegenerateAuthToken(ctx context.Context, t *auth_model.AuthToken) (*auth_mo
token, hash := generateTokenAndHash()
newToken := &auth_model.AuthToken{
ID: t.ID,
TokenHash: hash,
UserID: t.UserID,
ExpiresUnix: timeutil.TimeStampNow().AddDuration(time.Duration(setting.LogInRememberDays*24) * time.Hour),
ID: t.ID,
TokenHash: hash,
PreviousTokenHash: t.TokenHash,
RotatedUnix: timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
UserID: t.UserID,
ExpiresUnix: timeutil.TimeStampNow().AddDuration(time.Duration(setting.LogInRememberDays*24) * time.Hour),
}
if err := auth_model.UpdateAuthTokenByID(ctx, newToken); err != nil {
updated, err := auth_model.UpdateAuthTokenByID(ctx, newToken, t.TokenHash)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
if !updated {
return nil, "", ErrAuthTokenStale
}
return newToken, token, nil
}
+17 -1
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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"gitea.dev/modules/util"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestCheckAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ func TestCheckAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("Empty", func(t *testing.T) {
token, err := CheckAuthToken(t.Context(), "")
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthTokenInvalidFormat)
assert.Nil(t, token)
})
@@ -105,5 +106,20 @@ func TestRegenerateAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotEqual(t, token, token2)
assert.NotEqual(t, at.ExpiresUnix, at2.ExpiresUnix)
// A second request validated the same cookie before the first rotation.
_, _, err = RegenerateAuthToken(t.Context(), at)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthTokenStale)
_, err = CheckAuthToken(t.Context(), at.ID+":"+token)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthTokenStale)
current, err := CheckAuthToken(t.Context(), at2.ID+":"+token2)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, at2.TokenHash, current.TokenHash)
timeutil.MockSet(time.Date(2023, 1, 1, 0, 1, 2, 0, time.UTC))
_, err = CheckAuthToken(t.Context(), at.ID+":"+token)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthTokenInvalidHash)
_, err = auth_model.GetAuthTokenByID(t.Context(), at.ID)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)
assert.NoError(t, auth_model.DeleteAuthTokenByID(t.Context(), at.ID))
}