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fix(auth): avoid "compromised account" false-alarm when login with remember-me token (#39686)
1. Remember the last token that has been rotated and skip its validation 2. Don't alarm when the token mismatch occurs in a short window
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7 files changed
+118
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-10
@@ -25,15 +25,12 @@ import (
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var (
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ErrAuthTokenInvalidFormat = util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("auth token has an invalid format")
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ErrAuthTokenStale = util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("auth token has been rotated")
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ErrAuthTokenExpired = util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("auth token has expired")
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ErrAuthTokenInvalidHash = util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("auth token is invalid")
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)
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func CheckAuthToken(ctx context.Context, value string) (*auth_model.AuthToken, error) {
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if len(value) == 0 {
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return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // the auth method is not applicable
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}
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parts := strings.SplitN(value, ":", 2)
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if len(parts) != 2 {
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return nil, ErrAuthTokenInvalidFormat
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@@ -53,7 +50,12 @@ func CheckAuthToken(ctx context.Context, value string) (*auth_model.AuthToken, e
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hashedToken := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[1]))
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if !util.CryptoConstTimeEqual(t.TokenHash, hex.EncodeToString(hashedToken[:])) {
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hash := hex.EncodeToString(hashedToken[:])
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if !util.CryptoConstTimeEqual(t.TokenHash, hash) {
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// Recently rotated cookies can still be in flight, but must not authenticate.
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if t.RotatedUnix.AddDuration(time.Minute) >= timeutil.TimeStampNow() && util.CryptoConstTimeEqual(t.PreviousTokenHash, hash) {
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return nil, ErrAuthTokenStale
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}
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// If an attacker steals a token and uses the token to create a new session the hash gets updated.
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// When the victim uses the old token the hashes don't match anymore and the victim should be notified about the compromised token.
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// Revoke the token so the attacker's rotated token (which shares this ID) can no longer be used.
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@@ -70,15 +72,21 @@ func RegenerateAuthToken(ctx context.Context, t *auth_model.AuthToken) (*auth_mo
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token, hash := generateTokenAndHash()
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newToken := &auth_model.AuthToken{
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ID: t.ID,
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TokenHash: hash,
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UserID: t.UserID,
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ExpiresUnix: timeutil.TimeStampNow().AddDuration(time.Duration(setting.LogInRememberDays*24) * time.Hour),
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ID: t.ID,
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TokenHash: hash,
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PreviousTokenHash: t.TokenHash,
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RotatedUnix: timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
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UserID: t.UserID,
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ExpiresUnix: timeutil.TimeStampNow().AddDuration(time.Duration(setting.LogInRememberDays*24) * time.Hour),
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}
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if err := auth_model.UpdateAuthTokenByID(ctx, newToken); err != nil {
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updated, err := auth_model.UpdateAuthTokenByID(ctx, newToken, t.TokenHash)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", err
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}
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if !updated {
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return nil, "", ErrAuthTokenStale
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}
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return newToken, token, nil
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}
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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
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"gitea.dev/modules/util"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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func TestCheckAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
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@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ func TestCheckAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
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t.Run("Empty", func(t *testing.T) {
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token, err := CheckAuthToken(t.Context(), "")
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthTokenInvalidFormat)
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assert.Nil(t, token)
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})
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@@ -105,5 +106,20 @@ func TestRegenerateAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
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assert.NotEqual(t, token, token2)
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assert.NotEqual(t, at.ExpiresUnix, at2.ExpiresUnix)
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// A second request validated the same cookie before the first rotation.
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_, _, err = RegenerateAuthToken(t.Context(), at)
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthTokenStale)
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_, err = CheckAuthToken(t.Context(), at.ID+":"+token)
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthTokenStale)
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current, err := CheckAuthToken(t.Context(), at2.ID+":"+token2)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.Equal(t, at2.TokenHash, current.TokenHash)
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timeutil.MockSet(time.Date(2023, 1, 1, 0, 1, 2, 0, time.UTC))
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_, err = CheckAuthToken(t.Context(), at.ID+":"+token)
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthTokenInvalidHash)
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_, err = auth_model.GetAuthTokenByID(t.Context(), at.ID)
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)
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assert.NoError(t, auth_model.DeleteAuthTokenByID(t.Context(), at.ID))
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}
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